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Abstract 
The process of economic integration over the past two decades has been accompanied by an 
expanding income wedge between skilled and unskilled workers in many developing 
countries. This was also the case for Ugandan wage employees during the 1990s, which was 
a period of abrupt trade opening and market reforms. This is a surprising result for an 
unskilled labour abundant country like Uganda in light of a standard Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
framework. But was the trade opening responsible for the increase in wage premia? By using 
a novel district-level analysis, I find that in fact increased trade reduced the returns to 
schooling in line with the H-O predictions. On the other hand, the intensification of domestic 
trade across districts during the period was associated with higher returns in those districts 
relatively endowed with skilled employees. This effect appears to be responsible for at least 
some of the rising returns to schooling among wage employees in Uganda. 
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1. Introduction 
The process of economic integration at the global level has been accompanied by 
increasing wage premia of skilled workers within many developing countries (Goldberg and 
Pavnick, 2007). This is a puzzling result in light of standard models of international trade à la 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O), which predict that trade liberalisation increases the rewards to the 
country’s production factor in which it is relatively abundant (usually unskilled labour in 
developing countries) vis-à-vis the other factors. The literature has tried to reconcile the theory 
with this empirical evidence in various ways, such as by introducing the effect of skill biased 
technical change (SBTC), by recognising that certain developing countries are skilled abundant 
relatively to others (Wood, 1999), or by introducing the concept of heterogeneity across firms 
with higher demand for skills by exporters following trade liberalization (Verhoogen, 2008). 
However these arguments are usually not applicable to many poor countries, such as most 
countries in sub-Saharan African (SSA), which are far from the technological frontier even after 
trade liberalisation and which are unskilled abundant relatively to most other developing 
countries. In fact the little empirical evidence available is inconclusive about the effects of trade 
integration on economic inequality in such countries (Meschi and Vivarelli, 2009). This paper 
provides new evidence on the impact of an abrupt trade liberalisation on the wage skill premium 
(measured by returns to schooling) in a Least Developed Country (LDC), i.e. Uganda. The timing 
of the trade liberalisation in Uganda (early 1990s) coincided also with a marked improvement in 
the relations with neighbouring Kenya, which prompted a boom in the trade between the two 
countries adding to the trade expansion induced by the liberalisation. The paper employs a novel 
identification strategy, which uses district as the unit of analysis and exploits the location of the 
main border-posts during the liberalisation period to predict the districts’ relative exposure to 
trade. This strategy allows for a relatively clean identification of the effects of trade on the wage 
premium controlling for other potentially confounding factors (including also a proxy for 
technical change) and overcoming the lack of firm-level data which is common in many LDCs. 
The analysis confirms the prediction of the standard H-O model for an unskilled labour abundant 
country as Uganda: districts more exposed to international trade following liberalisation 
experienced smaller increases in the wage skill premium relative to the other districts.  
The result is even more important considering that during the period of analysis (the 
1990s) Uganda experienced an increase in the wage skill premium, which could be mistakenly 
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interpreted as a by-product of the trade liberalisation of that period. This result is also in line with 
that of Amiti and Cameron (2012) for another unskilled labour abundant country (Indonesia), 
confirming that the standard H-O seems to be an adequate framework to think through the trade 
effects on inequality in such countries. As a further confirmation of the predictions of the H-O 
framework in this context, I also find that the increased domestic inter-district trade following the 
reforms in the 1990s is associated with a rise in returns to education in those districts relatively 
endowed with skilled labour.  
The district-based empirical strategy is convenient also in that it allows focusing on the 
bulk of the recent rise in economic inequality in developing countries, which is within rather than 
between regions (Demombynes et al., 2003; Yemtsov, 2003, Elbers et al., 2005). In this way the 
analysis complements an expanding literature on inequality between regions within developing 
countries (Kanbur and Venables, 2005; the special issue of Journal of Economic Geography, 
2005).  
This paper is explicitly related to the literature investigating the spatial dimension of 
inequality. Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) find that the different evolution of returns to 
education between regions explain an important fraction of the large and increasing North-South 
divide in the UK between 1982 and 1997. For example average earnings increased in London 
relatively more than in the North as returns to education in London grew faster (catching up with 
those in the other regions) and the share of educated labour increased relatively more quickly in 
London than elsewhere. However few studies go beyond the description investigating the 
determinants of these labour market inequalities within regions. Taylor (2006) finds that trade 
and technology intensity are the most relevant factors to explain within region inequality in the 
UK throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These results are consistent with both the theoretical 
predictions of the H-O model for a skilled labour-abundant Northern country and the expected 
effects of SBTC. He also finds that different education premia across regions are persistent over 
time. Such variation in inequality across space is likely to be associated with imperfect 
geographical mobility of labour. In fact in a context of perfect labour mobility, skilled labour 
would tend to move towards regions where the earnings’ skill premium is higher, and unskilled 
labour would do the opposite, thus equalising labour market inequalities across regions. Limited 
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geographical mobility of labour is usually more pronounced in developing countries’ labour 
markets, and Uganda is no exception.1  
To the best of my knowledge, only one study, by Yang (2005) on China, has analysed 
within-region labour market inequalities in a developing country context. He examines the 
determinants of returns to education across urban areas in China before and during the transition 
from planned to a market economy. His results reveal a large variability across cities, which is 
partly explained by skilled labour demand and supply related factors, such as the size of the 
technological and of the public sector, the presence of foreign firms, the level of infrastructure 
provision. Similarly to Yang (2005), I use a micro approach to analyse how returns to education 
in Uganda have evolved at the district level during the 1990s, but in addition my analysis 
explicitly tests for some of the channels through which market reforms may have influenced 
labour market inequalities.  
The present analysis also adds to the literature investigating the evolution of returns to 
education during periods of market reforms in developing countries. There is no clear evidence 
that returns to education have evolved homogeneously in the SSA region in a time of pro-market 
reforms. Evidence from Ghana between 1987 and 1992 (Canagarajah and Thomas, 1997), from 
Tanzania (Soderbom et al., 2006) and Uganda (Appleton, 2001) in the nineties suggest the 
presence of rising returns to education. On the other hand, Krishnan et al. (1998) find that returns 
in urban Ethiopia remained stable despite labour market reforms in the early 1990s; and 
Soderbom et al. (2006) find high but falling returns in the Kenyan manufacturing sector over the 
nineties. Soderbom et al. (2006) argue that economic policies are key to account for the 
differences in levels and dynamics of returns to education across countries. The high returns in 
Kenya relative to Tanzania at the beginning of the 1990s reflected a policy environment in Kenya 
more favourable to the liberal operations of market forces than in Tanzania. A decade of reforms 
in Tanzania brought the country’s polices more in line with those of Kenya. As a likely result the 
earnings profiles (at least in the manufacturing sector) were quite similar in the two countries at 
the end of the 1990s. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating explicitly the role 
of market reforms in the evolution of returns to education in the SSA context. 
                                                 
1 According to the data used in this paper on average only around 6% of the district’s labour force has changed 
districts between 1992 and 2000. In a typical year less than 2% of the work force change region in the UK 
(McCormick, 1997). 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section provides the context 
of the analysis describing the pro-market reforms and the evolution of the wage skill premium in 
Uganda in the 1990s; section 3 discusses the links between trade liberalisation and inequality; 
section 4 describes the data; section 5 presents the empirical approach; section 6 presents the 
results and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Uganda in the 1990s: Abrupt liberalisation and increased inequality 
Uganda underwent substantial pro-market reforms during the 1990s, which have 
transformed the economy in a number of ways. With the help of World Bank sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programme, the economy was considerably liberalised starting in 1987 
with the liberalisation process intensifying during the nineties. This process included the 
downsizing of the public sector, the privatisation of state owned enterprises, and measures aimed 
at lifting constraints to trade both domestically and internationally. These measures along with 
improvements in transport infrastructure have led to an increase in Uganda’s trade both across 
district and across borders. Such increases in trade are likely to have had a relevant impact on 
labour market inequalities, and most of the subsequent empirical analysis is devoted to testing for 
such impacts. Let us consider international and domestic trade in turn.  
International trade liberalisation was an important component of the Ugandan reform 
process in the 1990s. Table 1 shows that between 1994 and 2000 Uganda halved the average 
tariff rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world and more than halved the one vis-à-vis the other members 
of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Tariffs were rationalised 
being reduced to only three non-zero rates (with a maximum of 30% rate) and almost all import 
bans removed by 1998. Maximum tariff rates were reduced dramatically as well. Using actual 
trade data Rudaheranwa (2005) calculates that the average effective rates of protection due to 
applied tariffs fell from 35% in 1994 to 18% in 2001. Exports were also facilitated, for example 
through the reduction and then the abolition (in 1996) of the tax on coffee exports (the main 
Ugandan export) and a duty drawback scheme for exporters was introduced. 
This liberalisation was coupled by improvements in transport infrastructures and by a 
reduction in border-post transit times. This was achieved through an ambitious cross border 
initiative to promote regional trade, especially with Kenya and Tanzania, introduced in 1993. 
These factors contributed to a large increase in trade during the nineties. According to 
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COMTRADE data, imports in particular grew by 50% between 1994 and 1999 from USD 680 
million to over USD 1 billion. And this figure does not likely document the magnitude of the 
total increase in trade between 1992 and 1999, which is the period under consideration here, as a 
substantial jump in international trade occurred also between 1992 and 1994. During that period 
trade with Kenya, Uganda’s main trading partner, boomed as political relations stabilised after 
the two countries nearly went to war in 1992. A liberal and buoyant foreign exchange market and 
liberal immigration procedures by both countries enacted in those years facilitated the free flow 
of goods across the border.2  
While there is data to measure the increase in Uganda’s international trade, the rise in 
inter-district trade is more difficult to document in the absence of data on internal trade. However 
some pieces of evidence are consistent with a substantial increase in inter-district trade in the 
nineties. First, the monopoly commodity marketing boards, such as the Produce Marketing Board 
were dismantled in 1992. These boards de facto controlled trade and production by guaranteeing 
local agricultural producers a minimum price for their crops. Their elimination substantially freed 
inter-district trade in agriculture (van der Geest, 1999 p. 132).  
Second, explicit restrictions to cross-district product movements were removed in 1993 
(World Bank, 2008). Moreover, the process of domestic trade liberalization included also an 
attempt to open rural areas to markets through improvement of infrastructure. (DENIVA, 2005). 
This improvement contributed to a considerable reduction in overland transport costs during the 
nineties. Rudaheranwa (2005) calculates that the implicit taxation on Ugandan exports relating to 
transport costs declined from over 31% in 1994 to about 24% in 2003 for 40-foot containerized 
exports. This was coupled by transport policy reforms, such as the commercialisation of Ugandan 
Railways in the early 1990s, which improved efficiency in rail transportation and allowed the 
railway to compete with road transportation (Rudaheranwa, 2005).  
As data on inter-district trade is not available in Uganda, one indirect way to check for the 
increase in this trade over the nineties is to look at the variation in prices across districts over 
time. I use the same data as in the rest of the analysis - i.e. the Household Surveys carried out in 
1992 and 1999/2000 through the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) – 
                                                 
2 Newspapers in 1994 reported that “commercial traffic is so heavy that existing customs personnel are unable to 
cope with it and hundreds of vehicles loaded with goods spend up to a week awaiting customs clearance” (Ojulu, 
1994). And residents of the Uganda-Kenya border town of Busia defined the volume of trade across the border in 
that year as unprecedented in the past 20 years.  
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in order to compute such variation. The latter (as measured by the range/mean and the standard 
deviation/mean ratios) is lower in 2000 than in 1992 for commonly traded goods within Uganda 
as shown in Table 2. This finding is consistent with the price-converging effect of increased trade 
between districts during the 1990s. 
These reforms have been associated with a healthy growth rate of the economy, which 
averaged 7.1% per year in real terms between 1992/93 and 1999/2000, comparing favourably to 
the 4.7% of the previous period.3 However, in line with the experience of many developing 
countries which have increased their level of integration with the global economy, also Uganda 
has seen a rise in income inequality throughout the 1990s. During this period of intense reforms, 
overall inequality, as measured by the Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) index, 
grew substantially (Figure 1).4  
This result applies also to income inequality for wage employees and self-employed alike, 
as found by Appleton (2001) and Calì (2009) using returns to schooling as the measure of 
inequality.5 The results in the latter study suggest that the average effect of an extra year of 
education on employees’ wages increased from 8.7% in 1992 to 14.7% in 1999-2000 and the rise 
in the effect of primary education is larger than that of secondary education. The breakdown by 
educational level shows a convex shape in the returns to education. In both periods the marginal 
return to post-secondary education was higher than the returns before the secondary level. This 
convexity is in line with findings on other Sub-Saharan African countries, e.g. Soderbom et al. 
(2006) for Kenya and Tanzania and Baptist and Teal (2008) for Ghana. However, unlike in the 
case of Tanzania, the intensity of the convexity seems to have decreased somewhat during the 
nineties in Uganda. The ratio of post- to pre-secondary returns shrank from a factor of around 2.4 
in 1992 to a factor of around 1.4 in 2000, when the level of returns was significantly lower than 
in Tanzania (where it exceeded 27%). That was essentially due to a large increase in returns to 
primary education, which is encouraging for strategies aiming at expanding primary education 
                                                 
3 Based on National Account elaborated by the IMF and the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. 
4 The index ranges from 0 to 1 as a conventional Gini index and is built combining the Deninger and Squire (1996) 
inequality measure with the UTIP-UNIDO index, which is a wage inequality Theil measure for the industrial sector. 
The indices are developed by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and are available at 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
5 Given that access to education and educational achievements are unequally distributed across the population in 
developing countries, and that education is one of the major determinants of wage earnings, returns to schooling 
capture a substantial part of a country’s economic inequality. In a context of limited geographical labour mobility, 
such as Uganda in the 1990s, this measure of inequality tends to vary significantly across space.  
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provision as the one currently pursued by Uganda via UPE. To what extent the increase in the 
supply of (primary) educated workforce may offset this upward trend of returns to primary 
schooling is a question which will be tackled in the next sections. 
 
3. Trade opening and inequality in a developing country 
The rise in labour market inequality documented above appears to clash with the expected 
– according to the standard trade theory - labour market impact of increased trade for an unskilled 
labour abundant country like Uganda. The basic (2 goods, 2 factors, 2 countries) H-O framework 
predicts that countries specialise in the production of goods intensive in the factor which is 
relatively abundant at home. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem complements the H-O model by 
showing that trade liberalisation induces in each country an increase in the production of the good 
intensive in the abundant factor. Therefore freer trade would increase the demand for the 
relatively abundant factor of production. In a simple two-factor model with skilled and unskilled 
labour, the relatively abundant factor in a low income country as Uganda would be the latter. 
According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem this increased demand should be reflected in higher 
return to unskilled labour in developing countries. Conversely, the expected decrease in the 
demand of the skilled-labour intensive imported products should lead to a decline in the wage of 
skilled labour. 
The increased demand for (relatively) skilled labour associated with the rising wage 
premia in Uganda seems prima facie a puzzling result. To be sure this is the case for virtually all 
developing countries for which empirical evidence exists on the evolution of income inequality, 
and labour market inequality in particular, during the 1980s and 1990s (Goldberg and Pavnick, 
2007). As in Uganda, these periods also coincided with a marked increase in the exposure of 
developing countries to international markets in terms of lowering degree of trade protection, 
increasing share of trade in GDP and capital flows. These findings could be reconciled with the 
H-O framework once its basic assumptions are relaxed in two main ways (Anderson, 2005). First, 
adding natural resources as a further factor of production to the model may change the balance of 
relative abundance in those developing countries relatively rich in natural resources. Second, if 
one relaxes the H-O assumption that all countries have equal access to the best available 
production technology, then greater openness to that technology for countries that did not access 
it before liberalisation may increase the relative demand for skilled labour even in low-income 
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developing countries as better production technology is usually operated by relatively skilled 
labour.  
However, these considerations seem to have limited application in an LDC like Uganda. 
In fact its abundant factor would be unskilled labour even in a three-factor model. Labour-land 
ratio is relatively high in Uganda, especially by African standards. In terms of population density 
it ranks number 49 out of 191 countries of at least 1 million inhabitants; and it ranks number 7 
(out of 52) in Africa. Even the second argument has limited relevance in Uganda, as poor sub-
Saharan African countries tend to have limited access to the technological frontier even after 
trade opening (Soderbom et al., 2006; Baptist and Teal, 2008).6  
There are other possible alternative explanations for the increase in the wage skill 
premium in developing countries. For example empirical evidence suggests that usually unskilled 
labour intensive sectors are most protected before the liberalisation (Attanasio et al., 2004), 
which disproportionately affects such sectors. However the tariff data does not provide clear 
evidence for this pattern in Uganda, where the most protected sectors continue to be the most 
unskilled labour intensive sectors and tariffs have decreased substantially across all sectors. 
Another explanation concerns the concomitant increase in capital flows (along with 
liberalisation) which are usually complementary with skilled labour. Again, this does not seem to 
be the case in Uganda which has not received any significant amount of capital inflows following 
the liberalisation process.  
Perhaps the most interesting alternative explanation comes from the idea that firms are in 
fact heterogeneous and exporters tend to be more productive and produce better quality products 
than non exporters (Iacovone and Javorcick, 2010). More openness to trade induces an increase 
in firms’ productivity and/or in the quality of their product, as trade can shift resources from non-
exporters to exporters (Melitz, 2003) and firms in import competing sectors overcome 
competition by differentiating themselves. This firms’ upgrading process should induce in turn a 
higher demand for skill, and thus an increase in the skill premium. For example, as production for 
export markets tends to be relatively more skill-intensive than production for domestic markets, 
higher demand for exports will increase the relative demand for skilled workers. However as 
noted by Goldberg and Pavnick (2007) the empirical evidence on how this channel affects 
                                                 
6 In any instances, in the subsequent analysis I use a technological proxy to try to isolate the pure trade effects from 
the potential skilled-biased technological change (SBTC)-type effects of trade opening.  
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inequality is still scant. Moreover in the absence of good firm-level surveys for the 1990s in 
Uganda, we can only speculate the extent to which this channel may be at work in Uganda. One 
problem with this explanation in our case is that Ugandan exports are highly concentrated in 
unprocessed agricultural products (coffee, fish, maize, beans), the production of which is likely to 
be intensive in unskilled labour even for export. 
This discussion suggests that a country like Uganda is not expected ex ante to depart from 
the Stolper-Samelsuon prediction that increased international trade should reduce labour market 
inequality. This should also be the case for the impact of the likely rise in inter-district trade 
within the country described above. Similarly to the case of international trade, according to the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, districts relatively endowed with skilled labour are supposed to 
experience an increase in the relative wage of skilled employees following the increase in inter-
district trade.  
The subsequent district-level analysis offers one way to test for these hypotheses, 
employing a fairly novel identification strategy of the international trade effects on the wage 
premia based on the location of the districts rather than on their exposure to tariff reductions 
based on their production structure. 
 
4. Data  
The analysis is based on data from two Household Surveys carried out in 1992 and 
1999/2000 through the LSMS. These are the only nationally representative surveys available in 
Uganda covering economic and social characteristics over the period of time of interest. These 
contain data on about 10,000 households for 1992 and 1999/2000 (2000 henceforth). In 
particular, after excluding pensioners and students, data is available on about 3,600 and 2,600 
wage earners respectively. In cases when more than one of these individuals belongs to the same 
household, their labour market participation may potentially affect the decision of other members 
of the family to enter the labour market. I control for this by clustering the results of the analyses 
at the household level.7  
The households are located in districts, which are a third layer of administrative division 
in Uganda (regions and sub-regions being the first two). According to the Uganda Bureau of 
                                                 
7 Data is also available for about 5,600 and 5,700 crop farming enterprises in the two periods. These enterprises are 
run by self-employed labourers who represent most of the income earning population in Uganda. Despite their 
importance, I cannot include them in the analysis due to missing data on land used in the production for 1999/2000. 
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Statistics’ (UBOS) geographical division there were 38 districts in 1992 and 45 districts in 
1999/2000 as a number of districts have been split into two or more districts between 1992 and 
1999. For comparability reasons I keep the division of 1992 throughout the analysis. However 
data is available only on 41 of the 45 districts in the 2000 survey. Due to the insecure situation in 
the region bordering with Sudan, the data in 2000 is not available in four districts which were 
included in the 1992 survey: Kitgum and Gulu (Northern region), Bundibugyo and Kasese 
(Western region).  
Most of the district-level regressors used in the analysis are reported in the LSMS surveys 
at either the individual or the household level so that I can use micro information to construct 
labour market variables for each of the districts. Hence, these district-level factors can be treated 
as exogenous to individual decisions, but relevant to the determination of returns to education in 
local labour markets.8  
I also construct some of the district-level variables from the part of the surveys containing 
information on the communities of residence of the individuals surveyed. There are 1,216 and 
1,086 communities surveyed in 1992 and 2000 respectively, although not all of them are 
represented in the wage employees’ sample I use. The surveys gather various types of 
information, including on infrastructure, prices, health and education. I average this community 
data to generate the district-level variables. 
As noted by Goldberg and Pavnick (2007) there is a clear advantage in using households 
rather than firms’ surveys for this type of analysis as the latter contains much more limited 
information on worker and job characteristics than in household surveys. Therefore researchers 
have usually to resort to the familiar dichotomy between production and non-production, or 
white- and blue-collar workers, which cannot capture the labour inequality concept in an entirely 
satisfactory way.  
 
5. Empirical framework 
The empirical strategy consists of a two stage analysis similar in spirit to an increasingly 
large empirical literature (see for instance Guiso et al., 2004; Mattoo et al., 2008), which uses 
estimated coefficients from first stage regressions as dependent variables in a second stage 
                                                 
8 In fact there may be a problem of endogeneity if for instance those district-level variables determine the location of 
individuals or households with certain characteristics into a specific district. I try to control for this potential source 
of endogeneity below via instrumental variable estimation.  
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analysis. In the first stage I estimate standard wage regressions for employees at the district level 
separately for 1992 and 1999/2000. In the second stage I use returns to education from the 
district-level regressions as dependent variables to investigate the determinants of returns to 
education and the effects of pro-market reforms in the nineties. Such analysis is based on the 
assumption that districts define separate labour markets. This is a fair approximation in the case 
of Uganda as labour mobility between districts is fairly limited: according to the LSMS data 
inter-district migrants between 1992 and 2000 represent on average only 6% of the total district’s 
labour force. As mentioned above this is a very low figure by international standards. The idea 
that districts may represent different labour markets is also supported by the statistically different 
returns to education across districts found in the analysis below. 
 
5.1 First stage 
For each year I run separate Mincerian-type regressions (Mincer, 1974) at the district 
level in order to compute the variation of returns to education across space.  The basic equation in 
each year reads as follows: 
ici
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   (1) 
where wage is the (log of) nominal wage earned by wage earner i in community c, S is the 
number of years of formal education, N is the number of districts, dik is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if i resides in district k, and the value of zero otherwise; Вk is a column vector of 
coefficients associated to the interaction between the vector Dik of dik dummies and that of the 
standard Mincerian controls Wi (i.e. gender dummy, experience and its squared term); and γ are 
community-level fixed effects to control for highly localised time invariant factors that may have 
an independent impact on wages.9 Community fixed effects represent a severe control set given 
the individual data available: the employees covered in the surveys belong to 820 and 796 
communities in 1992 and 2000 respectively (with only a handful of communities being the same 
in both surveys). The effects of the covariates in W are not allowed to vary across districts, thus 
                                                 
9 This estimation computes a wage effect, i.e. the change in income earned by a labourer through an additional year 
of education (all else constant). This wage effect is technically not the same measure as returns to education, as the 
computation of (private) returns would require discounting the wage effects by the (private) cost of education. 
However the literature usually utilises the two terms interchangeably and that is also the approach followed here. 
12 
 
allowing to saving degrees of freedom. In any case in the empirical analysis I test the robustness 
of the results to allowing W to vary across districts.  
One problem with the implementation of such wage regressions is that S in (1) is likely to 
be endogenous to returns to education as unobserved individual ability may influence both the 
schooling outcome and the level of income. Data availability would allow us to use only parents’ 
education to instrument for years of education. However family background is likely to influence 
children’s income, thus casting doubts on the exclusion restrictions of such instruments (Card, 
1999). Moreover an increasingly popular view holds that OLS estimates appear to be remarkably 
close to the actual returns calculated using samples of twins and family background to control for 
ability bias (Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997; Card, 1999). Given the little expected overall 
bias of the OLS estimates and the substantial difference with IV estimates using parents’ 
background in Uganda (reported in Calì, 2009), I base the following analysis on OLS estimates. 
In addition since the eventual bias of the estimated β coefficients via OLS is not expected to 
differ systematically across districts, this should not be a concern in the district-level analysis. 
 
5.2 Second Stage 
In the second stage I use the β coefficients derived from (1) and their variants as 
dependent variables in order to identify the determinants of returns to education across districts 
and over time. The basic specification reads as follows: 
ktktktk
FE
kt dXqba εβ ++Γ++= 20001     (2) 
where FEktβ are the schooling coefficients estimated through (1) including community fixed 
effects, ak are district fixed effects, q is the relative quantity of skilled labour in district k at time t; 
X is a vector of demand for skilled labour shifters, and d2000 is a time dummy. The hypotheses 
are that the relative price of skilled labour would decrease in its relative supply and would 
increase in its relative demand (Katz and Autor, 1999).10  
The fact that the dependent variable in (2) is estimated rather than observed should not 
present any difficulties for the regressions aside from a loss of efficiency, unless the sampling 
error in the dependent variable (i.e. the difference between the true and the estimated value of the 
dependent variable) is not constant across observations. In this case the regression errors will be 
                                                 
10 The use of district fixed effects in the empirical specification ensures that other relatively fixed factors of 
production, such as land and to some extent capital, are controlled for. 
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heteroscedastic and OLS estimation may generate inconsistent standard errors (Lewis and Linzer, 
2005). As the samples in the LSMS are stratified at the district level, the estimated β in (3) should 
not have sampling errors which are systematically different across districts, that is
iiii ZWE εε ˆ),,Edu | ( i = , ∀ i in (2). On the other hand the large cross-district variation in the 
number of observations over which the β are estimated (see Table A2 in the Appendix) may 
represent a source of possible heteroscedasticity in the standard errors in (2). Lewis and Linzer 
(2005) show that the OLS method using White’s (1980) heteroscedastic consistent standard 
errors is generally the most reliable way of estimating regressions with estimated dependent 
variable in the presence of heteroscedasticity. That is the case except in two instances. First, 
when the share of the regression residual due to sampling error in the dependent variable is very 
high (at least 80%) Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimation is preferred. Second, when 
information about the sampling errors in the dependent variable is available and highly reliable, 
the feasible generalized least squares estimator developed by Lewis and Linzer (2005) is a more 
efficient option. However neither of these cases is likely to apply here: the eventual sampling 
error in the dependent variable is unknown, and it is likely to be not very high (if it exists at all) 
as argued above. Therefore I estimate (2) via OLS using White’s heteroscedastic consistent 
standard errors. To be on the safe side I also test the robustness of the results to excluding the 
district with the lowest number of observations (Kapchorwa), as this may be an important source 
of the dependent variable’s sampling error, and to estimating (2) through WLS. As shown below 
the results are little affected, suggesting that the standard errors in (2) are robust to the possible 
concerns related to the use of an estimated dependent variable.  
 
5.2.1 Control variables 
I measure the quantity of (relatively) skilled employees (the variable q in (2)) through the 
average number of years of formal schooling completed by the wage earners (employees 
education).11 The results of the analysis below are very similar when using the district’s share of 
wage earners who have completed an education equal or higher than the primary level as the 
quantity of skilled employees’ measure (result are available upon request).12 This control is 
                                                 
11 Table A1 in the Appendix describes the construction of the variables used in the regressions. 
12 This measure is justified as completion of primary schooling was still far from universal in Uganda in the nineties. 
The unweighted district-wise average share of adults that completed primary school for wage employees was 58% in 
1992 and 63% in 2000). 
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particularly important as investment in education has been identified as a key policy lever to raise 
the rate of growth and poverty reduction in Uganda both by the government and by the donor 
community.13 However a popular view holds that returns to schooling in poor countries may well 
fall as educational supply grows unmatched by a proportionate increase in demand (Bennell, 
2002).  
Admittedly, the supply of skilled employees may be endogenous to returns to education; 
this is the case for instance if higher relative returns in a district act as an incentive for employees 
to acquire more education or attract people with more education. As explained below I instrument 
this variable with distance to school in order to correct for the potential endogeneity bias.  
The rest of the control variables in (2), i.e. those included in X, include a number of 
skilled labour demand shifters. First, it is widely recognised that greater access to (and use of) 
technology increases the relative demand for skilled labour, even in low-income countries 
(Anderson, 2005). Adapting to a new technology is a difficult task which requires the use of 
skilled labour; in addition technological progress has often substituted unskilled labour (e.g., 
automatic assembly lines); finally, greater access to foreign technology allows developing 
countries to compete internationally in more skill intensive goods, raising their average skill 
intensity of production, and thus the relative demand for skilled labour. As the data available 
does not allow for the construction of a direct measure of the use and availability of technology in 
production, I use the average distance from each community in a district to the closest telephone 
booth (telephone distance) as a technological proxy.14 In the fixed effects specification in (2) this 
variable is effectively measuring a district-wise public telephone density. The telephone 
infrastructure was not developed in the nineties in Uganda (as in most LDCs). The median 
distance of a community from a telephone boot was 15 Km (and the mean was 27) in 1992 and 
12 Km in 2000 (with the mean of 24). This infrastructure can be considered as a good proxy of 
the technological frontier in such a context. This is confirmed also by the fact that telephone 
distance is statistically associated with the share of households’ income spent on electronic 
goods: the lower the telephone density the lower the consumption of electronic goods.15  
                                                 
13 One of the major steps in this respect has been the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1996. 
14 This supply of technology variable is likely to be more exogenous than demand-related variables, such as the share 
of households’ purchase of electronic goods in total household income is likely to be correlated with the same factors 
determining also returns to education, including level of education and income. 
15 The result is also robust to the inclusion of the average education and the initial share of electronic assets in total 
durable assets in the district (results available upon request). 
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Second, the urban sector is usually one in which the return to human capital is higher than 
in the rural sector. That is one of the reasons why other things being equal urban dwellers 
accumulate more human capital than their rural counterpart (Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Lucas, 
2004). Once controlling for the average level of human capital in the workforce, the share of 
employees located in urban areas (urban employment) should then be positively associated with 
returns to education. Finally, I also include the share of males in the population (male share) 
within the vector X to control for gender-based differences in demand for goods and services.16  
As mentioned above, employees education is likely to be endogenous in (2). Therefore I 
instrument it with the average distance of each community to the nearest primary school (primary 
school distance). In a context like Uganda with poor transport infrastructure and availability of 
vehicles, distance to school indeed represents a relevant obstacle to school attendance. According 
to the data in both LSMS surveys over 2% of schooling age population quoted distance from 
school as the most important reason for never enrolling into school or for dropping out. In 32% of 
the communities surveyed in 1992 distance from the school was an important or a very important 
reason in the decision of children not to enrol in one of the three most popular community’s 
primary schools.17 This is not surprising given that the mean of the primary school distance 
variable in 1992 was 3.7 Km with peaks as high as 48 Km.  
A potential problem with this variable is that it refers to the current period while the 
workforce and the adult population in general was educated before. However this may not be as 
big of a problem as it first appears. In fact, like most infrastructure, also schools take time to be 
built and to become operational. Thus there is likely to be a high degree of persistence over time 
in any measure based on schooling infrastructure, i.e. the average distance from school in 1992 is 
likely to be highly correlated to the distance during the periods when the current adult population 
was educated. This fact is indirectly corroborated by the results of the first stage regression 
presented in Table 3. Primary school distance is a negative and significant determinant of 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that I do not include any measure of the size of the public sector among the factors influencing 
the demand for skills although wages in the public sector are usually less linked to the actual marginal product of 
labour than those in the private sector (Flabbi et al., 2007, Yang, 2005). In fact Calì (2009) documents how the effect 
of the size of the public sector - defined as the percentage of employees employed in state-owned enterprises and 
local public firms – on returns to schooling is  not significant. The results suggest that the reason behind it is that the 
skilled employees variable captures a substantial share of the public sector effect on returns via its (positive) impact 
on the stock of educated employees, which appears to complement the traditional effect of public sector in 
compressing labour market inequalities. 
17 The question was not posed in the 2000 survey. 
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employees education (column 1). The relatively high F-statistic and partial R-squared suggest 
that the explanatory power of the instrument is satisfactory.  
In column (2) I also add a set of further instruments based on the same rationale, i.e. 
distance to the nearest secondary school (secondary school distance), its squared term (as its 
effect appears to be non linear) and the interaction between each distance variables with a post-
1992 dummy. These additional instruments will be added in the regression framework along with 
the interaction between employees education and a post-1992 dummy, as we will see below. It is 
worth noting that secondary school distance has a non linear U-shaped relationship with 
employees education. When the average distance to the secondary school is high, a further 
increase in this distance is associated with an increase in the average level of education. A 
possible explanation for this pattern may be that a high average distance in the absence of 
motorised transportation is probably associated with schools providing full boarding to the 
pupils. This may reduce the drop-out rate relative to a situation where the distance is high but not 
enough to have boarding schools, determining a higher secondary school completion rate. This 
non-linear pattern seems not to apply to primary schools probably because the average distance to 
these schools is generally much lower than that to secondary schools.18  
Other than being good predictors of a district’s level of education, the school distance 
variables need also to be exogenous in (2) in order to be correctly excluded from the second 
stage. In other words distance from schools needs to be unrelated to other determinants of returns 
to education not included in (2). This condition would not hold if for instance some unobserved 
shocks to the labour market which increased returns to education in a district (e.g. a new 
manufacturing plant requiring specialised labour) induced also the establishment of new schools 
in the same district (e.g. to supply perspective specialised labour for the plant). Although possible 
in principle this type of mechanism is not likely to be at work in an essentially public pre-
university schooling system as the Ugandan one (in 2000 only 10% of the primary schools were 
privately run). As the objective of any public education system should be to provide a public 
good to the population, this implies that the placement of primary and (possibly) secondary 
schools is likely to be mainly based on population criteria rather than on the basis of the effective 
                                                 
18 For instance in 1992 there was only one district with primary school distance above 15 Km (i.e. a long enough 
distance to make a daily commute on foot almost impossible, thus requiring the presence of boarding schools) 
against five for secondary school distance. 
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demand for education.19 The public good nature of schools is also one of the guiding principles of 
the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme launched in 1997. 
Also the regressions in Table 3 control for all other skilled labour demand shifters in (2), 
including urban employment. This inclusion is important with respect to the validity of the 
instrument, as it helps relieve the concern that the distance to school coefficient is not picking up 
the fact that distance to school is lower in urban areas and that urban areas have a higher skill 
demand than rural areas.  
The validity of the exclusion restriction assumptions is also supported by the test of 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen’s J) in the 2SLS specifications with more than one 
instrument, reported in the tables below. 
 
5.2.2 Identification of the trade effects 
Ugandan data does not allow the construction of district-wise trade tariffs’ changes, which 
have been used in other studies as proxy for the intensity of trade liberalisation (e.g. Attanasio et 
al., 2004 and Topalova, 2010). Instead I exploit the districts’ location and that of the main border-
posts to identify districts’ relative exposure to trade. As a proxy for the intensity of trade I 
construct a dummy variable Bpostk (named borderpost) which takes the value of 1 for districts 
that host a major border-post or which are close to one (i.e. less than 50 km from its centroid).20 
The identification of the relevant border stations is based on the work of the UBOS, which lists 
the major road border-posts in 2005 (UBOS, 2006). These border-posts are indicated in Figure 2.  
However, not all border-posts were equally operational during the nineties. In particular, 
those posts bordering Tanzania (to the South and to the East) and Kenya (to the East) were the 
only ones likely to experience a significant increase in international trade following the 
liberalisation. This is for three reasons. First, Kenya and Tanzania were among the largest trading 
partners of Uganda during the nineties (and they still are). Second, the majority of Uganda’s 
international trade transited through Kenya and Tanzania, mainly through the ports of Mombasa 
                                                 
19 Note that the inclusion of population as a control does not change the results in Table 3. I exclude it from the 
regressions below on the determinants of returns to education as its coefficient is never significant and reduces 
somewhat the power of the instruments although does not affect the overall results (results available upon request). 
This little effect of the population variable seems to be due to a similar pattern of population growth across districts 
with the fixed effects capturing the cross-district variation in population levels. 
20 The main results of the paper do not change when constructing the dummy assigning the value of 1 to the major 
border-posts and the adjacent districts. 
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and Dar-es-Salaam.21 Importantly, most of this trade was (and still is) formal thus being actually 
affected by reductions in tariffs.22 On the other hand, Uganda’s trade with Sudan (to the North), 
DRC (to the West) and Rwanda (to the South-West) was very limited in the nineties, due to civil 
unrest in these countries or in the Ugandan districts bordering these countries (in the North and 
North-West). For these reasons, I consider only the border-posts with Kenya and Tanzania for the 
construction of the variable. Moreover, among those listed by UBOS I exclude those which were 
not active for most of the nineties.23 This leaves four major border stations identified by UBOS 
(2006) whose name is circled in Figure 2: Busia, Malaba, Mutukula and Mirama Hills. I also add 
Kampala district to this list of road border-posts as it hosts the major airport in Uganda (Entebbe) 
through which all Uganda’s international trade via air transited in the nineties (and still does). 
Moreover the city of Kampala has also an important border in the railway station for goods 
transported by train to and from Kampala. 
In order to (indirectly) test the appropriateness of the choice of the borderpost variable as 
a proxy for the intensity of trade, let us perform a test using the approach developed by Nicita 
(2009) for Mexico based on the pass-through literature. The basic idea of this approach is to test 
the significance of the impact of borderpost on changes in prices of traded goods following the 
liberalisation. Let us take a simplified version of the model developed by Nicita (2009). Prices of 
imported goods at the district level can be expressed as the product of the international price, the 
exchange rate, the import tariff and transport costs: 
gktgtgttgkt TCPXeP )1(
* τ+=       (3) 
for each traded good g, district k and period t, where the asterisks denote variables expressed in 
foreign currency. In this framework the international price is given. For each good g, this 
translates into the empirical specification: 
dtkkkt dBpostdP ερρα ++×+= 2000220001 )(    (4) 
where Bpostk is borderpost and is an inverse measure of transport costs. As tariffs have been 
decreasing (and transport connections are improving) over the nineties, the time dummy is 
effectively an indication of trade liberalisation. I test the specification (4) on three different goods 
                                                 
21 This information is based on personal communication with the UBOS staff. 
22 This naturally applies to imports; however also exports are likely to have been affected as tariffs within COMESA 
(which Kenya and Tanzania are both part of) were reduced; also there was an increased integration of the East Africa 
Community (EAC), again which both Kenya and Tanzania are members of. 
23 This identification is based on trade data and information provided directly by UBOS. 
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(second hand shirt, wheelbarrow and hoe), which were both imported and produced domestically 
in the nineties, and whose import tariffs were cut between 1994 and 2000. The coefficient of the 
interaction between the time dummy and the border-post variable Bpostk should capture the 
extent to which prices are differently affected across districts according to their proximity to the 
main border-posts. Following Nicita (2009), ρ1 is expected to be negative, as the pass-through 
effect (from international to district-level prices) also depends on transportation costs and local 
production could become more profitable when transport costs are high. If these are not the major 
borders through which the goods are imported into Uganda, the interaction effect should not be 
significant.  
As Table 4 shows (columns 1-4) ρ1 is negative and significant for all goods (for hoe the 
coefficient is significant only at the 15% level, column 3). This result is unaffected by the 
inclusion of a set of controls that may capture co-determinants of prices, i.e. the districts’ total 
population and the share of population in urban areas (column 4). To check whether the negative 
coefficient is not only picking up the location of those districts on the border, I test whether the 
same result holds even when using a dummy taking the value of 1 if the district is on the border 
with another country (Border). This variable has an insignificant effect on the price of second 
hand shirt (column 5), confirming that borderpost is identifying the major trading districts of 
Uganda. 
Note that by construction this test is applicable only to imports but not to exports. 
However the borderpost variable is likely to capture the intensity of exports as well, as the 
exports transit through the same major border-posts as the imports (UBOS, 2006). In any instance 
the effect of the trade liberalisation process is captured mainly through the changes in imports as 
those are the direct consequence of the liberalisation. Moreover in 1999 exports were still 10% of 
GDP while imports represented over 20%. Thus it is mainly the impact of changes in imports that 
I test through the variable Bpostk.   
I use borderpost to test for the effects of international trade on returns to education 
through an extended version of equation (2): 
ktkktktk
FE
kt ddBpostbXqba εβ +++Γ++= 2000200021   (5) 
where the interaction between Bpost and the post-1992 time dummy d2000 identifies the 
effects of trade on returns to education. This is essentially a difference-in-difference 
specification, which tests whether changes in returns to education are different in the ‘treated 
20 
 
districts’ (where the treatment is the increase in trade) relative to the control group. As discussed 
above, both the simple (based on the 2x2x2 model) and the extended version of the H-O model 
would predict that b2<0 in the case of Uganda.  
According to the H-O model, districts relatively endowed with skilled labour are 
supposed to experience an increase in the relative wage of skilled employees following a rise in 
inter-district trade. In order to test for this hypothesis, I extend equation (5) as follows: 
ktktkktktk
FE
kt ddSbdBpostbXqba εβ ++++Γ++= 200020001992,3200021     (6) 
where 1992,ktS  is the relative supply of skilled employees as measured by the share of skilled (i.e. 
at least primary educated) in total employees. The prediction from the H-O model in this case is 
that b3>0. This test is similar in spirit to that of Michaels (2008), who examines the effect of 
increased trade between US counties (induced by road infrastructure development) on the skilled-
unskilled wage gap.  
 
6. Results  
The returns to schooling (β coefficients) estimated via equation (1) display a large 
statistical variation across districts (see Table A2 in the Appendix). This provides further 
evidence that districts are likely to represent separate labour markets. The F-test strongly rejects 
the null of equality of returns to education coefficients in 1992 and even more strongly in 2000. 
Almost all of the coefficients are statistically significant at the standard levels in both years: 29 
out of 38 coefficients in 1992 and 33 of 34 in 2000 are significant at the 5% level. The only 
coefficient which is not significant in any years is that of Kapchorwa district, which is also the 
only negative coefficient in both periods. While these negative coefficients may be representative 
of true negative returns to education in that district, their estimation is very imprecise and the 
standard intervals of confidence include also positive values. Such imprecise estimates may be 
due to the very low number of employees over which the returns are computed (37 in 1992 and 
only 14 in 2000).24 Because of this I exclude Kapchorwa district from some of the specifications 
in the subsequent analysis as a robustness check. 
Figure 3 graphically represents the evolution of returns to education reported in Table A2 
on the Ugandan map. Although the increase in returns to education is general across districts, 
                                                 
24 These are among the lowest numbers of employees used in districts and over four times below the average number 
used in each district. 
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some geographical patterns of increases do emerge: interior districts in the Central and Western 
regions experience particularly significant rise in returns, while increases in the districts on the 
Eastern border appear to be more limited. I will test for some of these patterns more formally in 
the following analysis. 
Table 5 presents the results based on equations (2) and (5)-(6’). Column (1) runs the fixed 
effects regression without instrumenting the measure of the supply of education - employees 
education - which has a non significant effect on returns to education. The coefficients of the 
other variables are consistent with the expectations: negative for telephone distance and positive 
for urban employment and male share, although the latte is not significant. Instrumenting 
employees education (with primary school distance) reverses its sign, which is now negative 
(column 2). This result is consistent with the idea that endogeneity may bias the educational 
coefficients downwards as is the case if higher returns to education generate incentives to invest 
in education.  
Column (3) tests for the effects of international trade opening by adding the 
borderpost*d2000 term (i.e. specification 5). The coefficient of this term is negative and highly 
significant and indicates that during the 1990s returns to education in districts more exposed to 
international trade (i.e. districts including a major border-post or located near to one) decreased 
on average by 5.5 percentage points relative to the others. This is a significant difference 
considering that the average returns to education were between 13 and 15% in 2000 and that they 
grew by around 6 percentage points during the 1990s. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction from the simple H-O framework as well as from its extensions, as discussed above: a 
higher exposure to international trade seems to have increased the relative demand for unskilled 
labour in Uganda. The inclusion of the trade variable increases the absolute magnitude and the 
significance of all the other coefficients. Therefore failure to consider the impact of trade causes 
an underestimation of the effects of the co-determinants of returns to education. In particular, a 
rise in the supply of relatively educated labour is now associated with statistically lower returns 
to education: a 10% increase in the average years of education of wage employees is associated 
with a reduction of 1.6 percentage points in returns.  
The borderpost coefficient is almost halved when the other controls are excluded and its 
significance drops substantially (column 4), suggesting that such controls are mediating a sizable 
part of the effect of international trade on returns to schooling. Without taking into account the 
22 
 
effects of these controls one may mistakenly conclude that increased international trade has had 
no significant impact on wage inequality in Uganda. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of the borderpost variable into specification (5) does not 
substantially affect the time coefficient (d2000), which remains strongly positive. This suggests 
that the observed increase in returns to education over the nineties is not likely to have been 
driven by trade opening, but rather by other factors. 
The increase in domestic trade may be a good candidate in this respect, as shown in 
column (5), which presents the results of specification (6). I address the likely endogeneity of the 
new variable skilled employees1992*d2000 by adding secondary school distance and the interaction 
between distance to school variables and the post-1992 dummy to the list of instruments. The 
coefficient of the new variable (b3 in equation 6) is positive and significant as expected. Returns 
to schooling in a district with a share of skilled employment 10% larger than the average in 1992 
would rise by 3.5 percentage points above the average between 1992 and 2000. This results is 
consistent with Michaels (2008), who finds that increased inter-county trade induced by the 
construction of an inter-state highway raised wage inequality in US counties relatively abundant 
in skilled labour. Interestingly, the inclusion of this interaction term wipes away the positive 
coefficient of the post-1992 dummy, providing some prima facie evidence that the increased 
internal trade and market liberalisation may go some way towards explaining the rising wage 
inequality during the 1990s.  
The addition of this interaction term (employees education1992*d2000) makes the skilled 
employees coefficient not significant, suggesting that the positive effect of education supply on 
inequality is entirely driven by the positive effect in districts with relatively educated employees.  
Along similar lines of specification (6), I also examine whether there is a differential 
effect of increased international trade on returns to education according to the initial level of 
skills. I add a double interaction term to (6):  
ktkktktkktktk
FE
kt ddBpostSbdSbdBpostbXqba εβ +++++Γ++= 200020001992,420001992,3200021 )(
 
(6’) 
with the H-O hypothesis being that b4>0 (i.e. the negative effect of international trade on returns 
to education is smaller in districts relatively endowed with skilled employees than in the others). 
In column (6) I first test for this effect without accounting for the general positive effect of initial 
education on returns to schooling. The b4 coefficient is positive and significant, i.e. among those 
districts more exposed to trade more skilled districts experience a lower decline in returns 
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relatively to the others. However the result does not hold when I put empl. edu1992*d2000  back in 
the regression, as the b4 coefficient becomes not significant although it remains positive (column 
7). This result suggests that there is no statistically differential impact of trade across districts on 
the basis of skills, i.e. b4 in (6’) is not significantly different from zero. The addition of this triple 
interaction inflates both the borderpost*d2000 coefficient and its standard errors probably due to 
the high collinearity with Skilled empl1992*borderpost*d2000. 
An interesting further question is whether any other trade theory than the traditional H-O 
framework can offer an alternative (or complementary) explanation for the effects of trade 
reforms on the skilled-unskilled wage gap observed in Uganda. The New Economic Geography 
core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991) predicts that a reduction in trade costs gives firms an 
incentive to move production to regions with relatively good access to foreign markets, such as 
border areas or port cities. Hanson (1997) shows that following NAFTA production within 
Mexico relocated towards the Mexico-US border and away from Mexico City. In the case of 
Uganda the international trade liberalisation was mainly a unilateral liberalisation, as described 
above. Therefore increased access to markets during the nineties did not happen much along the 
country’s international borders, but it rather occurred within the domestic borders through a 
reduction in internal trade costs. According to the core-periphery model this should lead to an 
increased concentration of economic activity near the main market(s). In the case of Uganda 
Kampala district represents by far the densest area in terms of economic activity in the country. 
But while the predictions of this framework are clear with respect to the (re-)location of 
economic activity within a country following a trade shock, they are less clear as far as the 
districts’ skilled-unskilled wage gap is concerned. This will ultimately depend on the skill 
intensity of the productions the district specialises in. If the domestic goods that Kampala’s 
market demands are relatively skill intensive then a reduction in internal trade barriers may lead 
to the concentration of relatively skilled economic activity in nearby districts. All else equal, this 
would generate an increase in the skilled wage premium in those districts and vice-versa in the 
districts further away.  
Empirically I try to identify any such effects through an interaction term between the 
distance (in log) to Kampala and the post-1992 dummy.25 I add this variable in column (8), but 
                                                 
25 This distance is calculated with the method of the great circle distance between the city of Kampala and the 
centroid of the district. 
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the coefficient is not significant (while borderpost remains unaffected). Taking out borderpost 
from the regression – which is not shown here - makes distance to Kampala positive and 
significant. This suggests that after liberalisation districts closer to Kampala experience a decline 
in returns relative to those further away and this effect is driven entirely by Kampala’s role as a 
major border-post rather than as a major market.  
 
6.1. Robustness 
Although the main results of the analysis appear to be quite neat, I test their robustness to 
a variety of checks. Tables 6 and 7 present the results of these checks. First, one potential concern 
with these results is that they may be driven by the choice of first stage specification to estimate 
the β coefficients used as dependent variables in equation (6). In column (1) I use β coefficients 
estimated through OLS without community fixed effects as dependent variables (βOLS). This way 
of estimating β allows for more degrees of freedom in the first stage. Both the main coefficients 
of borderpost and Empl edu92*d2000 are little affected. So far the estimation of β has been based 
on the other Mincerian coefficients in the first stage (vector W in (1)) being constrained not to 
vary across districts. In column (2) I use β coefficients estimated by relaxing this constraint, 
which is analogous to estimate the βs via separate regressions for each district (βFE(sep)).
26 Again 
the main results are robust to this change of variable. 
The standard method of computing the βs through (1) assumes the same marginal effect 
across education categories. As it is often the case, however the marginal effect may differ 
between levels of education. In order to allow for such heterogeneous effects, I re-write (1) as an 
extended wage equation with the educational variable constructed as a spline function with N 
nodes at selected levels of education (see Moll, 1996): 
ici
N
k
J
j
ijkjik
N
k
ikkic WSddwage εγβα ++Π++= ∑∑∑
= == 1 11
   (1’) 
                                                 
26 In particular the first stage specification becomes: 
iii
N
k
ikk
N
k
iikk
N
k
ikki WDSddwage εγβα ++Β++= ∑∑∑
=== 111
. 
25 
 
where Sij is the number of years attended at the j-th level. In particular, I follow the three 
educational levels in Uganda to mark the nodes, i.e. primary, secondary and post-secondary.27 
The main results are robust also to using returns to primary schooling as the dependent variable 
(column 3). The absolute magnitude of borderpost and especially of empl edu92*d2000 coefficients 
increases, suggesting that the impact of both variables on returns to schooling is driven by their 
effect on returns to primary schooling. In other words higher exposure to international trade has 
the effect of decreasing the employees’ wage gap essentially between primary educated and less 
educated employees.  
Following Flabbi et al (2008), I also estimate specification (6) through WLS using the 
inverse of the standard errors of the returns to education coefficients as weights. This should 
account for the fact that the β are estimated with different levels of precision in (1). Again, 
estimates obtained through this method change little compared to the baseline estimation (column 
4). The results are also robust to the exclusion of the outlier district Kapchorwa (column 5).  
As mentioned above, to the extent that a higher premium for educated labour attract 
higher skilled employees, in a context of unrestricted labour mobility the results may be biased 
by reverse causality. Another way to tackle this potential problem other than IV estimation is to 
control for inter-district migration. Data on inter-district migrants between 1992 and 2000 is 
available in the 2000 survey. Therefore I add to the expression (6) the interaction between the 
share of skilled migrants (i.e. at least primary educated) in the district’s total adult population and 
the post-1992 dummy. I also include its squared term due to the non linear effect of migration on 
returns: 
ktkkktkktktk
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kt dMigbdMigbdSbdBpostbXqba εβ +++++Γ++= 2000
2
52000420001992,3200021    (7) 
The inequality reducing effects of trade is robust even to the inclusion of migration 
controls. The signs of the migration variables are consistent with the idea that a higher skilled 
immigration rate depresses returns to schooling as it raises the supply of skills up to a certain 
threshold, after which returns benefit from higher skilled migration. The latter phenomenon is in 
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line with the hypothesis of increasing returns to skills in situation of relatively high concentration 
of skilled workers. The inclusion of the migration controls reduces somewhat the employees edu 
interaction coefficient making it only mildly significant. This suggests that some of the greater 
rise in returns to education in relatively highly skilled vis-à-vis the less skilled districts following 
the domestic liberalisation is explained by inter-district migration.  
 
6.2. Robustness for borderpost 
So far the results for the effects of international trade on returns to schooling have 
implicitly relied on the assumption that the ‘treatment’ (i.e. increased international trade over the 
1990s) was exogenous to returns to education as it was determined by districts’ location. As all 
the major border-posts had been in place for some time before the beginning of the liberalisation 
process, this assumption seems reasonable. But what about if those districts had been selected to 
host the border-posts on the basis of certain unobserved characteristics (e.g. good infrastructure) 
which had also an effect on returns to education? The districts’ fixed effects should account for 
these characteristics as long as they are time invariant. However to the extent that some 
unobserved shocks (e.g. an improvement in the infrastructure network to facilitate international 
trade) may affect only those districts hosting a border-post (or close to one) as well as returns to 
education, this may generate a bias in the borderpost*d2000 coefficient. In order to control for this 
possibility I instrument borderpost*d2000 with a dummy identifying all the districts bordering 
Kenya and Tanzania interacted with the post-1992 dummy. This variable is highly correlated 
with borderpost due to the way the latter has been constructed (i.e. considering only the active 
border-posts during the 1990s, which were on the borders with Tanzania and Kenya). This is 
confirmed by the high F-statistics (14.08) and partial R-squared (0.55) of the first stage 
regression for borderpost (not shown here). Furthermore, the test of overidentifying restrictions 
(Hansen’s J) supports the exclusion restriction assumptions for all IV specifications (Table 7, 
column 1).  
Instrumenting borderpost has the effect of raising slightly its coefficient (cf. Table 7, 
column 1) which remains highly significant, like all other variables as well. The inclusion of 
borderpost in the endogenous variable list reduces the F-statistics. To control that the results are 
not influenced by the relatively weak predictive power of the instruments, I exclude Empl. edu92 * 
d2000 from the regression in column (2). This raises the first stage F-statistics again while the 
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Borderpost coefficient is reduced back to the level of the not instrumented regression (cf. Table 5, 
column 3). I also run the same regression as in column (1), which includes Empl. edu92 * d2000, 
using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method, which performs better than 
standard IV when instruments are weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005). The results are once again 
unaffected with the Borderpost coefficient raised further (column 3). 
Finally, I check that borderpost is not capturing the effects of districts being located on 
the foreign border of Uganda rather than the actual effects of trade. In order to do that I use a 
different proxy for the intensity of trade, i.e. a variable identifying the districts on any national 
borders (i.e. including also those bordering Sudan, DRC and Rwanda) interacted with a post-
1992 dummy (border*d2000). The fact that this variable is not significant (column 4) adds 
confidence to the claim that borderpost identifies those districts more exposed to Uganda’s 
international trade in the 1990s, which instead did not occur much through the country’s 
Northern and Western borders. 
 
7. Conclusions  
Trade liberalisation is often associated with rising wage skill premium in developing 
countries. That was the case also in Uganda where wage inequality substantially increased during 
the 1990s, a decade of abrupt trade liberalisation. In order to explicitly test for the effects of this 
liberalisation on the wage skill premium, I employ a novel two stage district-level analysis, 
exploiting districts’ location to predict their relative exposure to trade and controlling for skills’ 
supply and demand related variables. In this way the analysis can also overcome the lack of firm-
level data, which analyses of trade and inequality usually are based on, typical of LDCs during 
that period. 
I find that the rising wage skill premium in Uganda – measured by returns to schooling - 
is not the product of international trade integration, which on the contrary tends to reduce the 
wage premium consistently with the predictions of the standard H-O framework. In particular, 
during the 1990s returns to education in districts more exposed to international trade decreased 
on average by 5.5 percentage points relative to the others. On the other hand, the intensification 
of domestic trade across districts during the 1990s (another by-product of the reforms) was 
associated – again in line with the H-O predictions - with larger increases in returns in those 
districts relatively endowed with skilled employees at the beginning of the period.  
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These findings are robust to using a variety of dependent and controls, estimation 
methods and samples. They also appear to be causal in nature as confirmed by the results of the 
IV estimation which tackles the potential endogeneity of the skills’ supply variables through a set 
of instruments based on districts’ distance to primary and secondary schools. 
These results reconcile the widening wage skill gap following trade opening with the 
standard H-O model predictions of a relative rise in the returns to the (relatively) abundant factor 
of production, i.e. unskilled labour in the case of Uganda. They suggest that the standard H-O 
model - and the related Stolper-Samuelson theorem - may well be a suitable framework to 
analyse the effects of trade integration on wage inequalities in low income unskilled labour 
abundant countries.  
More importantly from a policy angle, these findings support the idea that trade 
integration tends to reduce wage inequalities in countries endowed with unskilled labour 
relatively to their trading partners. LDCs as Uganda usually fall in this category. More evidence 
on the effects of trade integration in other such countries would be needed to substantiate this 
relationship more robustly. In addition the evidence available is so far confined to the case of 
wage employees, while little is known about the impact on self-employed, who usually operate in 
a separate – and very important – labour market than wage employees. 
If it wasn’t trade liberalisation, what drove the increase in wage inequality in Uganda 
during the 1990s? While the effect of domestic market reforms and the related increased in cross-
district trade seems to account for most of the rise in returns to education in our analysis, the 
question remains open. Given the data constraints, in particular the inability to measure cross-
district trade, this finding can provide only some prima facie evidence of the possible direction of 
the effects of domestic market reforms on wage inequality. A more precise identification of such 
effects would be needed in order to properly assess to what extent these reforms may explain 
rising returns to schooling in the 1990s in Uganda. In a similar vein, more analysis would be 
needed on the role of SBTC in explaining the rise in inequality. The analysis above provides 
some evidence that higher access to technology at the household level increases returns to 
education. However better proxies for access to technology, possibly at the firm level, would be 
needed before settling the question on the role of SBTC in wage inequality. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Uganda’s import tariff rates between 1994 and 2000  
 Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
WORLD 
Tariff rate 1994 17.34% 9.09 0 60 
Tariff rate 2000 9.36% 5.42 0 15 
 
COMESA 
Tariff rate 1994 9.78% 9.12 0 66 
Tariff rate 2000 4.25% 2.11 0 6 
Source: UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System 
 
 
Table 2: Measures of price variation across Ugandan districts, 1992-2000 
  Year Mean Std. Dev Min Max range/mean StDev/mean 
        
Soap 
1992 685 58 600 925 0.47 0.09 
2000 818 64 772 1,083 0.38 0.08 
Hoe 
1992 3,536 518 2,165 4,838 0.76 0.15 
2000 3,277 296 2,981 4,583 0.49 0.09 
Wheelbarrow 
1992 26,389 9,761 1,500 60,000 2.22 0.37 
2000 42,178 6,717 20,000 54,643 0.82 0.16 
Bicycle 
1992 94,235 13,745 69,286 131,667 0.66 0.15 
2000 87,632 11,687 76,667 139,375 0.72 0.13 
Source: author’s elaboration on household survey data 
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Table 3: First stage regressions for employees education 
  (1) (2) 
Employees 
education 
Employees 
education 
Primary school distance 
-0.070*** -0.062*** 
(0.016) (0.014) 
Sec. school distance 
-0.188** 
(0.075) 
Sec. school distance sq. 
0.0048*** 
(0.0013) 
Primary school dist.*Post-92 
-0.841** 
(0.387) 
Sec. school dist.*Post-92 
0.198*** 
(0.048) 
Other controls YES YES 
Observations 68 68 
Nr. of districts 34 34 
R-sq. (within) 0.249 0.549 
Partial R-sq. 0.210 0.499 
F-stat 18.46 96.18 
Robust standard errors (Huber-White method) in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%; all regressions include district fixed effects and year effect; other controls include 
the other controls in Table 5. Partial R-squared is the R-squared of the school distance variables (i.e. 
excluded instruments in the Tables 5-7); F-statistics refers to the test for the joint insignificance of the 
school distance variables. 
 
Table 4: The effects of distance from border-posts on changes in prices of a unit 
of traded goods, 1992-2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Shirt Wheelbarrow Hoe Shirt Shirt 
      
Borderpost x 
d2000 
-0.129** -0.282* -0.076 -0.129**  
(0.050) (0.170) (0.052) (0.049)  
d2000 
-0.027 0.638*** -0.056 -0.056 -0.058 
(0.044) (0.162) (0.050) (0.047) (0.073) 
Border x d2000 
    -0.011 
    (0.081) 
Constant 7.818*** 10.079*** 8.164*** 7.879*** 7.819*** 
Controls NO NO NO YES NO 
      
Observations 71 69 72 71 71 
Nr. of district 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.201 0.451 0.150 0.215 0.113 
Robust standard errors (Huber-White method) in parentheses; dependent variable is the 
price (in Ugandan Schelling) of the product in log; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%; all regressions include district fixed effects. Controls include the 
share of population in urban areas and districts’ total population. 
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Table 5: The effects of trade on returns to education in Uganda, 1992-2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE FE IV FE IV FE  FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
 βFE βFE βFE βFE βFE βFE βFE βFE 
         
Borderpost x 
d2000 
  -0.055** -0.032 -0.062*** -0.488** -0.291 -0.059** 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.224) (0.206) (0.024) 
Employees 
education  
0.004 -0.011 -0.016*  0.024 -0.014* 0.017 0.023 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) 
Telephone 
distance (x100) 
-0.069** -0.078*** -0.090***  -0.078*** -0.092*** -0.080*** -0.075*** 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Urban 
employment 
0.159* 0.171** 0.225***  0.284*** 0.243*** 0.270*** 0.281*** 
(0.084) (0.086) (0.074)  (0.079) (0.063) (0.075) (0.082) 
Male share 
0.402 0.378 0.511  0.927* 0.539 0.815* 0.931* 
(0.478) (0.473) (0.475)  (0.480) (0.419) (0.428) (0.481) 
Empl. edu1992 x 
d2000 
    0.035**  0.024 0.034** 
    (0.014)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Empl. edu1992 x 
Borderpost x d2000 
     0.055** 0.030  
     (0.028) (0.026)  
Log Distance to 
Kampala x d2000 
       0.005 
       (0.008) 
d2000 
0.062*** 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.060*** -0.174* 0.091*** -0.092 -0.195 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.102) (0.013) (0.118) (0.144) 
         
Observations 72 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Nr. of districts 38 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R-sq. (within) 0.516 0.459 0.509 0.421 0.566 0.624 0.635 0.571 
1st stage F-stat  17.40 17.42  3.476 17.63 3.227 3.250 
Hansen J-stat     3.627  4.130 4.549 
Chi-sq(3) P-val.     0.305  0.248 0.208 
Dependent variable is return to education as estimated through equation (3). Robust standard errors (Huber-White 
method) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-stat is the statistics for the 
joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage; Hansen J-statistic is the over-identification test. 
Endogenous variables are skilled employees, population edu and skilled employees1992*d2000. Skilled employees and 
population edu are instrumented through distance to primary school, distance to secondary school, distance to secondary 
school squared and distance to secondary school x Post-1992 dummy. In the specifications with Skilled empl1992*d2000, 
distance to secondary school squared is replaced by distance to primary school x Post-1992 dummy in the instrument set. 
The 4 districts with a single observation are dropped in the IV estimations. 
 
35 
 
Table 6: The effects of trade on returns to education in Uganda, 1992-2000, robustness checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
FE IV FE IV FE IV 
FE IV 
(WLS) 
FE IV FE IV 
 βOLS βFE (sep) 
PRIMARY
OLSβ  βFE βFE βFE 
       
Borderpost x d2000 
-0.048** -0.063*** -0.086** -0.052** -0.044** -0.049** 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.043) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) 
Employees  edu92 
x d2000 
0.048*** 0.031** 0.136** 0.029** 0.033** 0.027* 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.062) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
Mig92 x d2000  
     -1.182** 
     (0.596) 
Mig92 x d2000 
squared 
     4.695* 
     (2.623) 
       
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 68 68 68 68 66 68 
Nr. of districts 34 34 34 34 33 34 
R-squared 0.632 0.554 0.406 0.626 0.674 0.627 
1st stage F-stat 3.476 3.476 3.476 4.822 3.557 2.462 
Dependent variables are return to education as estimated through equation (1) and its variants. Robust standard 
errors (Huber-White method) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
F-stat is the statistics for the joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage; Hansen J-statistic is 
the over-identification test. Endogenous variables are employees education and employees edu1992 x d2000. 
Employees education and employees education1992 x d2000 are instrumented through distance to primary school, 
distance to secondary school, distance to primary school x Post-1992 dummy and distance to secondary school x 
Post-1992 dummy. In column 5 Kapchorwa district is excluded.   
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Table 7: The determinants of returns to education, robustness for Borderpost 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE IV FE IV FE IV LIML FE IV 
Borderpost x d2000 
-0.072** -0.054* -0.088* 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.049) 
Employees  edu92 x 
d2000 
0.036** 0.060* 0.038 
(0.015) (0.032) (0.024) 
Border x d2000 
-0.019 
(0.029) 
 
Borderpost instrumented YES YES YES NO 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 68 68 68 68 
Number of districts 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.553 0.590 0.329 0.444 
1st stage F-stat 3.099 15.10 3.099 5.555 
Hansen J-stat 4.725 4.593 3.323 1.848 
Chi-sq(3) P-val. 0.193 0.332 0.344 0.605 
Dependent variables are return to education as estimated through equation (1). Robust 
standard errors (Huber-White method) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. F-stat is the statistics for the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments in the first stage; Hansen J-statistic is the over-identification test. Endogenous 
variables are employees education, employees edu1992 x d2000 and Borderpost in those columns 
in which it is indicated. Employees education, employees edu1992 x d2000 are instrumented 
through distance to primary school, distance to secondary school, distance to primary school x 
Post-1992 dummy and distance to secondary school x Post-1992 dummy. Borderpost*d2000 is 
instrumented through a dummy for districts bordering Kenya and Tanzania.   
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Figure 1: Income inequality in Uganda (EHII measure), 1992-2000  
 
Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database 
 
 
Figure 2: The major border-posts in Uganda 
 
Source: UBOS (2006) 
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Figure 3: Returns to education for wage employees across Ugandan districts, 1992-2000  
 1992  2000 
 
Note: returns to education are increasing in the tonalities of red (i.e. the higher the returns, the more red the district)
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Description of district-level variables 
Variable’s name Units Description 
   
Employees education Years 
 
District-wise average number of years of formal 
schooling completed by the wage earners  
 
Telephone distance Km 
Average distance from the centre of each community 
within a district to the closest public telephone booth 
 
Urban employment Percentage 
District-wise number of wage earners located in 
urban areas over total district’s number of wage 
earners 
 
Male share Percentage 
 
District-wise share of males in the adult population 
 
Primary school distance Km 
Average distance from the centre of each community 
within a district to the closest primary school 
Secondary school distance Km 
 
Average distance from the centre of each community 
within a district to the closest secondary school 
Borderpost Dummy 
 
Value 1 if the district hosts a major border-post or is 
close to one (i.e. less than 50 km from its centroid); 0 
otherwise. 
Border Dummy 
 
Value 1 if the district is bordering a foreign country; 
0 otherwise. 
Migration92 Percentage 
 
District-wise population with primary education or 
above that migrated into the district after 1992 over 
total adult population of the district 
Skilled employees Percentage 
District-wise share of wage earners who have 
completed an education equal or higher than the 
primary level (i.e. 7 years or more) 
 
   
Source: World Bank LSMS on Uganda for 1992 and 1999/2000. 
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Table A2: Returns to education across Ugandan districts, 1992-2000 
District 
No. 
District 
name 
1992 2000 
β1992 S.E. Nr obs β2000 S.E. Nr obs 
        
1 Kalangala 0.082 0.034 56 0.133 0.023 32 
2 Kampala 0.105 0.010 430 0.173 0.013 235 
3 Kiboga 0.082 0.026 44 0.158 0.068 23 
4 Luwero 0.081 0.019 64 0.193 0.031 74 
5 Masaka 0.079 0.015 169 0.159 0.014 128 
6 Mpigi 0.146 0.014 237 0.174 0.016 199 
7 Mubende 0.141 0.019 73 0.136 0.017 69 
8 Mukono 0.070 0.019 161 0.157 0.023 161 
9 Rakai 0.208 0.034 58 0.203 0.032 37 
11 Iganga 0.072 0.023 93 0.165 0.028 87 
12 Jinja 0.130 0.015 242 0.178 0.017 125 
13 Kamuli 0.032 0.032 44 0.202 0.023 64 
14 Kapchorwa -0.025 0.019 37 -0.058 0.113 14 
15 Kumi 0.048 0.020 49 0.245 0.024 24 
16 Mbale 0.072 0.018 126 0.131 0.019 129 
17 Pallisa 0.096 0.032 34 0.117 0.037 32 
18 Soroti 0.073 0.031 62 0.148 0.032 61 
19 Totoro 0.048 0.021 90 0.114 0.019 104 
21 Bundibugyo 0.010 0.035 32   0 
22 Bushenyi 0.133 0.022 107 0.144 0.017 97 
23 Hoima 0.147 0.035 39 0.164 0.023 61 
24 Kabale 0.084 0.024 63 0.160 0.023 71 
25 Kabarole 0.114 0.013 181 0.182 0.014 115 
26 Kasese 0.049 0.022 110   0 
27 Kibaale 0.128 0.022 38 0.191 0.036 38 
28 Kisoro 0.027 0.041 22 0.184 0.038 41 
29 Masindi 0.090 0.029 39 0.162 0.026 45 
31 Mbarara 0.098 0.013 240 0.155 0.017 156 
32 Rukungiri 0.093 0.032 55 0.140 0.017 58 
41 Apac 0.116 0.022 44 0.161 0.031 26 
42 Arua 0.061 0.020 92 0.149 0.027 87 
43 Gulu 0.072 0.019 93   0 
44 Kitgum 0.117 0.029 64   0 
45 Kotido 0.175 0.056 65 0.172 0.048 42 
46 Lira 0.059 0.023 78 0.113 0.029 72 
47 Moroto 0.149 0.030 80 0.115 0.021 29 
48 Moyo 0.047 0.025 53 0.180 0.034 45 
49 Nebbi -0.019 0.034 21 0.116 0.034 27 
        
 Mean 0.087 0.025 94 0.153 0.029 77 
 S.D. 0.049 0.009 82 0.048 0.018 53 
 Signif. (5%) 29/38  33/34  
 Signif. (1%) 24/38  30/34  
 F-stat 15.99  37.70  
Note: βs are estimated through the FE method in equation (1); the F-stat is the test for the joint 
significance of the β coefficients; Nr obs. refers to the number of observations over which β is estimated.  
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